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The Role of Non-Profit Organizations in 
Shaping Food Law and Corporate 
Responsibility in the United States 
Melissa M. Card 
INTRODUCTION 
Disputes between Europe and the United States over real 
and perceived concerns about food safety demonstrate different 
perspectives on corporate responsibility and different 
institutional processes for settling those differences.1 For 
example, in the United States, a bill concerning genetically 
engineered labeling was sponsored and drafted by the Senate 
Agriculture Committee focusing on industry needs.2 However, 
Europe adopted a labeling approach for genetically engineered 
products based on input from various non-profit organizations 
focusing on consumers’ concerns.3 
Non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) are assumed to 
be counterweight to capitalism and globalization.4 NGOs 
promote what they perceive to be more ethical and socially 
         Melissa M. Card J.D., Associate Director of the Institute for Food Laws and 
Regulations at Michigan State University, and Adjunct Professor for Michigan State 
University College of Law. Copyright 2017: all rights reserved, no part of this document 
may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means. 
1. Compare Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419,
1995 WL 360309, at *1 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated sub nom. Liebeck v. 
Restaurants (N.M. Dist. Nov. 28, 1994) (exemplifying the litigious society of the United 
States, in which consumers hold corporations responsible), with DAVID VOGEL, THE 
MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 8 (2006) (declaring that interest in Corporate Social Responsibility exists 
on the European continent). 
2. Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 § 202, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (1946).
3. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24 (EU).
4. See Jonathan P. Doh & Terrence R. Guay, Corporate Social Responsibility, Public
Policy, and NGO Activism in Europe and the United States: An Institutional-Stakeholder 
Perspective, 43 J. OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 47, 47, 51 (2006) (stating that others suggest 
that NGOS may cause risks of ‘privatizing’ public policies that deal with environmental, 
labor, and social issues, thereby leading to a loss in democratic accountability).  
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responsible business practices.5 In addition, NGOs create and 
institutionalize new norms in society. With the use of social 
media and dynamic documentaries, non-profit organizations are 
able to successfully network and influence public opinion about 
various food safety topics.6 But is it advantageous for the United 
States to adopt an institutional process similar to Europe’s, 
where non-profit organizations provide input on food law and 
corporate responsibility? 
This article will assess whether the United States should 
adopt an institutional process similar to Europe’s by giving non-
profit organizations a role in shaping food law and corporate 
responsibility. Part I provides a comparative analysis of 
genetically engineered product regulations in the United States 
and European Union (EU). Part II explains how the institutional 
processes of the United States and Europe led to the varying 
regulations, and demonstrates that the United States institutional 
structure is too different from Europe’s to allow NGO’s to have 
a role in shaping food law and corporate responsibly. Finally, 
Part III asserts that the United States should change its 
institutional process by allowing public universities and private 
colleges to influence food law and corporate responsibility. This 
article concludes that public universities and private colleges 
afford collaboration from a diverse group of individuals who are 
likely to have both the industry’s needs and consumers’ 
concerns in mind. 
I.  The Comparative Analysis of the Institutional 
Processes of the United States and Europe Through 
the Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods 
Genetically engineered (“GE”), more commonly 
genetically modified, refers to the genetic modification through 
the use of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (“rDNA”) 
techniques to express desired traits.7 The food industry often 
5. E.g., Cristina Brandão, et al., Social Responsibility: A New Paradigm of Hospital
Governance?, 21 HEALTH CARE ANAL., 390, 391 (2013) (explaining that a number of 
organizations embrace a socially responsible conduct, meaning that citizens, and investors, 
are deeply aware that profit and ethical values are not incompatible).  
6. E.g., WHAT THE HEALTH (Vimeo 2017).
7. NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
277 (Wily ed., 2d ed. 2017) (asserting that genetically modified, or more precisely 
genetically engineered, indicates that humans have directly engineered the DNA). Cf. id. 
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creates genetically modified organisms and genetically modified 
plants to produce a target trait of a nonrelated species.8 For 
example, Calgene, Inc. modified its FLAVR SAVR™ tomatoes 
to contain lower levels of a naturally occurring enzyme, 
resulting in ripe fruit remaining firm for an extended period of 
time and allowing fresh market tomatoes to remain on the vine 
longer for enhanced flavor.9 While the technology concerning 
GE foods is identical, GE food regulations in the U.S. and EU 
vary considerably.10 The United States focuses on the end 
product, and the EU focuses on the process.11 This section 
delves into the regulatory and labeling requirements for GE 
foods in the U.S. and the EU. 
(defining conventional plant breeding to mean all breeding methods other than by rDNA 
techniques). See generally Rachele B. Bailey, A Tale of Two Systems: A Comparison 
Between U.S. and Eu Labeling Policies of Genetically Modified Foods, 15 SAN JOAQUIN 
AGRIC. L. REV. 193, 197 (2006) (stating that genetically modified organisms have been 
altered in a way that would not occur naturally, allowing selected genes to be transferred 
between non-related species).  
8. See Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision
Favoring the U.S. Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 777 (2008) (considering the implications of the precautionary 
principle, the role of multilateral environmental agreements, the ability of nations to apply 
safeguard measures, and ultimately the appropriateness of the WTO as a body for 
determining environmental and food policy). As it relates to food, genetically modified 
organisms and genetically modified plants are created when the genes of one organism are 
inserted into the DNA of another organism to produce the target trait in that nonrelated 
species. Id. 
9. Agency Summary Memorandum Re: Consultation with Calgene, Inc., Concerning
FLAVR SAVR™ Tomatoes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Food 
/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/GEPlants/Submissions/ucm225043.htm#out2 (last updated 
Oct. 13, 2015). When developing the FLAVR SAVR™ tomatoes, Calgene, Inc., a 
Californian company, used rDNA techniques to introduce an antisense polygalacturonase 
(PG) gene. Id. The PG gene is ordinarily present in tomatoes. Id. The PG gene encodes the 
enzyme PG, which is associated with the breakdown of pectin. Id. The principle underlying 
the FLAVR SAVR™ tomato was that the antisense PG gene suppresses the production of 
the PG enzyme. Id. 
10. See Katharine Gostek, Genetically Modified Organisms: How the United States’
and the European Union’s Regulations Affect the Economy, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 
761, 761-63 (2016) (explaining that the changes to the EU’s regulations will not benefit the 
EU’s economy, but changes in U.S. regulations may benefit the U.S. economy); see also 
FORTIN, supra note 7, at 486 (asserting that genetically modified organisms and food 
derived from genetically engineered organisms have been a contentious matter in 
international trade). 
11. Jessica Lau, Same Science, Different Policies: Regulating Genetically Modified
Foods in the U.S. and Europe, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS 
AND SCIENCES: SCIENCE IN THE NEWS (Aug. 9, 2015), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/ 
flash/2015/same-science-different-policies/. 
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A. GE Food Regulations and Labeling 
Requirements in United States 
Various federal agencies, such as U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”), the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”), share regulatory oversight of GE products.12 While 
various federal agencies have regulatory oversight over GE 
foods, the FDA ensures that the nation’s foods, including 
products that have been genetically modified, are safe for 
consumption.13 FDA asserts that conventional foods and GE 
foods pose the same risks; they can potentially contain allergens, 
toxins, or anti-nutrients.14 Due to this assertion, GE foods are 
regulated in the same manner as conventional foods based on the 
doctrine of substantial equivalence.15 In accordance with this 
doctrine, any GE crop varieties produced using rDNA 
techniques are considered to be essentially the same as the 
conventional varieties produced using traditional breeding 
methods.16 GE foods are considered to be the same as the 
conventional varieties because the substances expected to 
become components of food—as a result of genetic modification 
of a plant—will be the same as, or substantially similar to, 
substances commonly found in foods, such as proteins, fats and 
12. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302,
23,302-03 (Jun. 26, 1986) (noting the relevant agencies and their functions in the 
administration of the Coordinated Framework). The Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service determines whether a genetically modified plant has the potential to harm natural 
habitats or agriculture. Id. The EPA regulates specific genetic modifications that protect 
plants from insects, bacteria, and viruses, including plants that have been genetically 
modified to contain a pesticide trait. See id. The USDA, along with the APHI, oversees the 
release of certain categories of plants and the field testing of Genetically Engineered crops. 
Id. 
13. See Statement of FDA Mission, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.
gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/budgetreports/ucm298331.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2017). (“FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the 
safety, efficacy and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical 
devices, our nation’s food supply cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.”).  
14. See FORTIN, supra note 7, at 279. Anti-nutrients are natural or synthetic
compounds that interfere with the absorption of nutrients. Statement of Policy - Foods 
Derived from New Plant Varieties, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda. 
gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Biotechnology/
ucm096095.htm (last updated May 2, 2016) [hereinafter Statement of Policy].  
15. Maria R. Lee-Muramoto, Reforming the “Uncoordinated” Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 311, 338 (2012). 
16. Id.
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oils, and carbohydrates.17 Thus, if the conventional food’s traits 
are considered safe, then a GE food’s traits—that are 
substantially equivalent—would also be considered safe. For 
example, the FDA stated that the genetic modifications for the 
FLAVR SAVR™ tomato resulted in nutritional characteristics 
that were within the range of existing tomatoes; therefore, the 
FLAVR SAVR™ tomatoes were substantially equivalent to 
existing tomatoes.18 Based on federal regulations, conventional 
foods do not ordinarily require premarket approval.19 Therefore, 
the FDA is not required to conduct any independent safety, 
allergen, or other tests, to differentiate GE foods from their 
conventional counterparts.20 
While GE food products are ordinarily exempt from 
premarket review and approval, there are instances in which 
food manufacturers are subject to premarket requirements. If a 
GE food is not substantially equivalent to the conventional food, 
then the FDA would require premarket review and approval.21 
When GE foods require premarket review and approval, the 
products are treated as a food additive and must go through a 
food additive review.22 Additionally, the FDA recommends that 
17. Statement of Policy, supra note 14.
18. See Jennifer A. Thelen, FDA Regulation of Food and Drug Biotechnology,
LEDA AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8846761 
/jthelen.html?sequence=1 (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) (stating that the FDA concluded that 
FLAVR SAVR™ tomatoes had not been significantly altered when compared to varieties 
of tomatoes with a history of safe use).  
19. Cf. 21 U.S.C. 348 (inferring that premarket approval is required for food
additives, unless an exemption from the regulations concerning food additives applies). 
20. Lee-Muramoto, supra note 15, at 338 (2012) (declaring that the FDA does not
conduct independent safety or allergen testing, unless the GE food product contains an 
allergen that people would not generally expect in that particular food).  
21. See FORTIN, supra note 7, at 283 (stating that if a GE-derived food is significantly
different in function or structure, then it is treated as a food additive). To be different from 
conventional foods, a food must be different from conventional foods in a meaningful way 
or present any different or greater safety concerns than conventional foods. Statement of 
Policy, supra note 14. For example, if a food was genetically engineered to include 
allergens that the conventional food did not have, then the FDA would not find that the GE 
food was substantially equivalent to the conventional food. See Lee-Muramoto, supra note 
15, at 338.  
22. FORTIN, supra note 7, at 283. Any food additives intended to have a technical
effect in food is deemed unsafe unless it either conforms to the terms of a regulation 
prescribing its use or to an exemption for investigational use. Guidance for Industry: 
Questions and Answers About the Petition Process, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformatio
n/ucm253328.htm#answerA (last updated July 1, 2016). A petition for a food additive is 
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food manufacturers communicate with the FDA even if the 
differences between the GE food and the conventional food are 
not significant.23 
In the United States, labeling of GE products is shared 
between various federal agencies.24 Under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act there is no labeling mandate for foods that are 
genetically modified.25 The FDA stated that “labels would 
erroneously imply that genetically modified foods differ from 
conventional foods and that conventional foods are in some way 
superior.”26 However, if the composition of a GE food differs 
significantly from its conventional counterpart, that information 
would require labeling.27 This stems from the misbranding 
submitted to request issuance of a regulation allowing new uses of the additive and must 
contain the necessary supporting data and information. Id.  
23. Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or
Have Not Been Derived from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm059098.htm (last updated July 
1, 2016) [hereinafter Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling].  
24. See FORTIN, supra note 7, at 293 (stating that the three primary agencies that are
involved with regulating GMO safety, are also involved the labeling). 
25. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“Act”) requires labeling because (1) the
labeling is expressly required by the Act, or (2) the information is “material”, as used in the 
Act, and the absence of the information is considered misleading under section 201(n) of 
the Act. Id. On July 29, 2016, President Obama signed the National Bioengineered Food 
Disclosure Standard into law which, in part, directs USDA to establish a national standard 
to disclose certain food products or ingredients that are bioengineered. See generally 7 
U.S.C.A. § 1639b (West). As a result of the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure 
Standard, the regulations issued by the USDA will establish labeling of human food 
derived from biotechnology. See id.  
26. MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: THE POLITICS OF FOOD SAFETY 145-50, 222
(Darra Goldstein ed., 2010) (discussing the alleged benefits of genetically engineered 
foods).  
27. 21 U.S.C. 321(n) (proving that labeling is misleading if, among other things, it
fails to reveal facts that are material in light of representations made or suggested in the 
labeling, or material with respect to consequences that may result from the use of the food 
to which the labeling relates under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling, or under 
such conditions of use as are customary or usual). The term “material” is actually not 
defined in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Historically, the agency has interpreted the 
term, within the context of food, to mean information about the attributes of the food itself. 
Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling, supra note 23. For example, FDA has required 
special labeling in cases where the absence of such “material” information may: (1) pose 
special health risks; (2) mislead the consumer in light of other statements made on the 
labeling; or (3) in cases where a consumer may assume that a food, because of its similarity 
to another food, has nutritional, organoleptic, or functional characteristics of the food it 
resembles when in fact it does not. Id. The FDA does not consider the methods to create 
GE food to be “material” within the meaning of “misleading” in section 201(n) as used in 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id.  
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provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.28 While labeling 
is generally not required by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
manufacturers may voluntarily label their GE food products, 
provided that such labeling is truthful and not misleading.29 
In conclusion, the United States determines the safety of a 
GE food product based on its composition, not the method or 
process by which it was produced.30 Based on this 
determination, most GE foods are not subject to premarket 
review or approval.31 In addition, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act does not require a specific labeling scheme if a food has 
been genetically engineered.32 
B. EU’s Regulatory Requirements Concerning GE 
Foods and Labeling Requirements 
Since 2003, the precautionary principle has governed the 
EU’s approach to GE foods.33 The precautionary principle is 
risk-adverse; because potential risks of GE foods are not 
completely known, regulatory decisions require a high burden of 
proof for product safety.34 Therefore, in the EU, all GE food 
products go through a premarket approval process.35 Companies 
of GE food products submit applications for approval to an EU 
member state; the centralized European Food Safety Authority 
28. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (stating that a food is misbranded if its labeling is false or
misleading in any particular). 
29. Labeling of Foods Derived from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/geplants/ucm 
346858.htm (Jan. 1, 2017). In general, an accurate statement about whether a food was not 
produced using bioengineering is one that provides information in a context that clearly 
refers to bioengineering technology. Examples of such statements include: “not 
bioengineered” or “not genetically modified through the use of modern biotechnology.” Id.  
30. See Lee-Muramoto, supra note 15, at 338.
31. Id. at 334.
32. Id.
33. See Gostek, supra note 10, at 773.
34. Lau, supra note 11. Precautionary principle refers to preventing not only known
environmental harms and health risks but also to prevent conduct that may be harmful 
although scientific evidence is unavailable to prove actual harm. See FORTIN, supra note 7, 
at 489 (arguing that precautionary principle creates confusion because there is no standard 
definition, and any uncertainty on safety requires prohibition of a potentially harmful or 
risky activity until it is proven to be safe).  
35. See Lau, supra note 11 (asserting that all GE foods are regulated because they are
made with processes different from those used to produce conventional foods). 
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(“EFSA”) then conducts scientific risk assessments.36 After the 
EFSA’s acceptance of safety, the recommendation is forwarded 
to the European Commission.37 The European Commission 
Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection drafts 
proposals based on the EFSA’s risk assessment; however, it can 
reject or base its proposal on other considerations beyond the 
risk assessment.38 A regulatory committee comprised of 
representatives of member states’ authorities then decides 
whether to accept the proposal through a weighted voting 
system.39 If there is disagreement amongst the member states 
committee failing to reach a majority decision, then the 
European Commission makes the final decision for approval.40 
Following the approval, EU regulations mandate that 
manufacturers inform consumers that products are genetically 
modified through labeling.41 Specifically, a product containing 
more than 0.9% GE material must be labeled as being GE 
foods.42 Under EU regulation, if a food consists of more than 
one ingredient, the phrases “genetically modified” or “produced 
from genetically modified (name of the ingredient)” must appear 
36. See Sci. Commun. of the Eur. Comm’n, Risk Assessment, HEALTH AND FOOD
SAFETY: SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEES, available at http://ec.europa.eu/assets/sante/health/ 
scientific_committees/risk_assessment/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) (stating 
that the Scientific Committees assess the potential risks before making a legislative 
proposal, namely the probability and the severity of an adverse effect, in relation to the 
hazards and to the exposure) [hereinafter European Risk Assessment]. Margaret Rosso 
Grossman, Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed in 
the European Union, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 43, 85 (2005) (inferring that even though the 
EFSA conducts risks assessment for GE food products, EFSA has no authority to approve a 
product even if the product has been found completely safe). EFSA is an independent 
European agency funded by the European Union set up in 2002 following a series of food 
crises in the late 1990s which is responsible for risk assessment for food safety. See About 
EFSA, EFSA: EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/ 
aboutefsa (last visited September 4, 2017).  
37. See Lau, supra note 11.
38. See European Risk Assessment, supra note 36 (stating that the European
Commission makes a legislative proposal based on the risk assessment, and all other 
relevant aspects). For example, the European Commission may authorize a substance, 
prohibit a substance, or define exposure limits for a substance. Id.  
39. See Lau, supra note 11.
40. See id.
41. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 13 (EC).
42. Id. (“This Section shall not apply to foods containing material which contains,
consists of or is produced from GMOs in a proportion no higher than 0,9 per cent of the 
food ingredients considered individually or food consisting of a single ingredient, provided 
that this presence is adventitious or technically unavoidable.”).  
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in the list of ingredients in parentheses immediately following 
the applicable ingredient.43 If the ingredients are designated 
categorically, the phrase “contains genetically modified (name 
of organism)” or “contains (name of ingredient) produced from 
genetically modified (name of organism)” must appear in the list 
of ingredients.44 Lastly, if no ingredient list is present, then the 
phrase “genetically modified” or “produced from genetically 
modified (name of organism)” must be conspicuously on the 
labeling.45 
In conclusion, the EU’s regulations concerning genetically 
modified foods are among the strictest in the world.46 The EU 
focuses on the method or process of creation when determining 
the safety of a GE food, and not on the final composition. Due to 
this determination, all GE foods are subject to premarket review 
or approval.47 In addition, all GE foods that meet a specific 
threshold are required to meet a specific labeling scheme, 
disclosing that a food has been genetically engineered.48 
II. The Institutional Structures of the United
States Differs From Europe’s, Which Affects the 
Role That NGOs Have in Shaping Food Regulations 
and Corporate Responsibly 
The regulations of GE foods are different in the United 
States and the EU, however, both sides claim that their 
regulations were created to address public health and 
environmental safety issues.49 Because the purpose behind the 
43. Id. (indicating that this information may appear in a footnote to the list of
ingredients, but must be printed in a font of at least the same size as the list of ingredients). 
If there is no list of ingredients, then the information shall appear clearly on the labeling. 
Id.  
44. Id. (indicating that this information may appear in a footnote to the list of
ingredients, but must be printed in a font of at least the same size as the list of ingredients). 
If there is no list of ingredients, then the information shall appear clearly on the labeling. 
Id. 
45. Id.
46. See Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: European Union, LIBR. OF
CONG., https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/eu.php (last visited September 
4, 2017). 
47. Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers on EU’s Policies on GMOs, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N PRESS RELEASE DATABASE (Apr. 22, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
MEMO-15-4778_en.htm. 
48. Id.
49. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 59.
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regulations is the same, assessing the institutional processes of 
the United States and Europe that led to the varying regulations 
is imperative. This section explains how scientific uncertainties 
and ethical concerns played out differently in the EU and the 
United States due to institutional and ideational reasons.50 
Additionally, this section demonstrates that the United States 
institutional structure is too different from Europe’s to allow 
NGOs to have a role in shaping food law and corporate 
responsibility. 
A. The Influences Leading to GE Regulations 
The original EU regulations concerning GE products were 
very similar to the rules in the United States.51 However, food 
safety scares and the rise of anti-genetically engineered food 
protests in Europe sent the EU regulations concerning GE foods 
in a different direction.52 NGOs reinforced that the EU 
regulations should take a different direction.53 Industry tried to 
counter the NGOs viewpoint and dissipate the food safety fears, 
but industry actions only strengthened the NGOs’ position.54 
Europe adopted the precautionary principle based on input from 
various NGOs, which assumed the new genetic foods must be 
proven safe before introduction into the marketplace.55 The 
50. M.J. PETERSON, THE EU-US DISPUTE OVER REGULATION OF GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED ORGANISMS, PLANTS, FEEDS, AND FOODS – CASE SUMMARY, INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF ETHICS EDUCATION IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING CASE STUDY 4 
(2010).  
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. (stating that the food safety scares included: (1) a fear that humans would
contract “mad cow disease” from English beef, and (2) the discoveries of toxic materials in 
Belgian and French animal feedstocks).  
53. See, e.g., Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: European Union,
supra note 46 (asserting that NGOs expressed the need to clarify even further that the 0.9% 
labeling threshold is not a tolerance level but applies only to the adventitious and 
technically unavoidable presence of GMOs). 
54. See PAULETTE KURZER & ALICE COOPER, WHAT’S FOR DINNER? VARIATIONS 
IN EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 3 (2005), http://aei.pitt.edu/ 
3092/1/EUSAKurzerCooper05.pdf (“In countries with intensely hostile publics, the biotech 
industry, scientific experts, and government officials are outmaneuvered by anti-GMO 
voices, who reclaim the debate by introducing new concepts concerning the risks inherent 
in experimenting with technological innovations to the country’s food production 
regime.”). 
55. See Lesley K. McAllister, Judging Gmos: Judicial Application of the
Precautionary Principle in Brazil, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 149, 150 (2005) (stating that the 
precautionary principle embraces the idea that full scientific certainty should not be 
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EU’s resistance regarding GE foods related to three 
environmental risks associated with biotechnology: (1) 
genetically engineered traits could harm non-target species; (2) 
cross-pollination could cause relatives of the cultivated crop to 
inherit the genetically modified trait; and (3) pests targeted by 
the genetic modification will evolve resistant.56 
While the EU’s regulations were largely influenced by 
NGOs, the regulations in the United States were largely 
influenced by the food industry.57 US firms developing 
agricultural applications of GE technologies formed an effective 
nationwide industry lobby.58 The industry based lobbying group 
successfully influenced how GE products would be regulated. 
In 1986, the Reagan administration set the basic parameters 
of the United States’ policy in the Coordinated Framework for 
the Regulation of Biotechnology,59 which ensured the 
development of biotechnology without burdensome 
regulations.60 Then in 1989, the National Research Council 
(“NRC”) published an influential report regarding the safety of 
GMOs,61 concluding that “the product of genetic modification 
required before governments take preventative action against potentially serious 
environmental harms).  
56. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), MODERN FOOD 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, HUMAN HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT AN EVIDENCE-BASED STUDY iii 
(2005); see generally Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, 
and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVT’L. L.J. 297 (2002) (linking Bt corn 
to pest resistance).  
57. PETERSON, supra note 50, at 5 (asserting that due to pressures from conservatives
and business interests, the United States’ regulatory approaches for genetically modified 
products rely heavily quantifiable estimates of potential harms and benefits used to make 
cost-benefit analyses). 
58. Id. at 11 (comparing the United States industry lobbying techniques with
European firms; Europe failed to form industry lobbies, particularly at the EU-wide level). 
59. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302-03 (Jun. 26, 1986) (explaining that the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation 
of Biotechnology encouraged the approach under which the federal agencies in the United 
States treated genetic modification the same as other forms of breeding).  
60. See Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically
Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C.L. REV. 733, 738 (2003) (reviewing the 
development and implementation of the regulatory framework of GE products through 
FDA, USDA, and EPA). 
61. See Gostek, supra note 10, at 767. The purpose of the National Research Council
is to help improve public policy, understanding, and education in matters of science, 
technology, and health. See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, 
MEDICINE, ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160519172226/http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc/na_0
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and selection should be the primary focus for making decisions . 
. . not the process by which the products were obtained.”62 In 
addition, NRC concluded that although information concerning 
“the process used to produce a genetically modified organism is 
important in understanding the characteristics of the product . . . 
the nature of the process is not a useful criterion for determining 
whether the product requires less or more oversight.”63 Lastly, 
the NRC report concluded that “[t]he same physical and 
biological laws govern the response of organisms modified by 
modern molecular and cellular methods and those produced by 
classical methods.”64 The NRC Report was a large step towards 
the acceptance of GE products.65 
In conclusion, regulations concerning GE foods, as well as 
GE food labeling, differ in the United States as compared to the 
EU.66 The United States focuses on the end product, while the 
EU focuses on the process.67 The varying regulations resulted 
from scientific uncertainties and ethical concerns playing out 
differently in the EU and the United States. In addition, the EU’s 
regulations were influenced by NGOs, and the regulations in the 
United States were influenced by industry interest groups. 
B. Institutional Structures of the United States and 
Europe 
EU NGOs’ influence on GE product regulations was 
successful; however, NGOs in the United States failed to 
influence GE regulations.68 Due to the varying institutional 
70358.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2017) (“The Council of the National Academy of 
Sciences, under the authority conferred upon the Academy by its charter enacted by 
Congress and approved by President Lincoln on March 3, 1863.”). 
62. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS 14 (1989), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/1431/ 
field-testing-genetically-modified-organisms-framework-for-decisions. 
63. See id. at 14-15.
64. See id. at 15.
65. Strauss, supra note 8, at 779 (presenting that the US does not segregate from non-
GE crops because, in stark contrast to the EU, U.S. law does not require labeling, 
segregating, or monitoring of these crops). 
66. Id. at 779-81.
67. Lau, supra note 11.
68. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 60-61 (asserting that NGOs in the United
States had not succeeded in extending these adversarial relationships to biotechnology 
policy-making). The NGOs in the United States stated their failure to influence GE 
regulations stemmed from “a lack of news-grabbing biotechnology”, and failure to use the 
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structures, NGOs play a different role in shaping food law and 
corporate responsibility in the United States than in Europe.69 
Institutional variation between the United States and Europe 
emanates from differences in social, political, economic, 
historical, and geographic experiences.70 
The United States focuses on federal and sub-federal 
institutions.71 The focus on federalism and the separation of 
national powers stems from a historical experience, emphasizing 
a decentralized political structure.72 The resulting decentralized 
political system creates numerous access points for NGOs to 
influence the government.73 However, NGOs have no formal 
standing in the public policy process.74 Therefore, NGOs fail to 
successfully lobby in the United States. 
While the United States is focused on federal and sub-
federal institutions, Europe is focused on EU-wide and national 
institutions.75 This institutional structure affords NGOs success 
when influencing regulation. In addition, interest groups have a 
formal place in the policy- making process.76 For NGOs, the 
main access points to influence policy-making are the 
Commission and Parliament.77 The Commission is the initial 
drafter of legislation and welcomes the opportunity to receive 
information from lobbyists.78 Lastly, multiparty political 
systems exist in most EU member states, making it easier for 
judicial system. Id. Note, that NGOs have gained some success in influencing GE labeling 
regulations. See generally 7 U.S.C.A. § 1639b (West).  
69. See id. at 49 (explaining that the main institutions in Europe and the United States
include political, legal, and social). 
70. See generally, NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
(Harry R. Garvin ed., Bucknell University Press 1977). 
71. See Cristina Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional
and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J., 2094, 2096 (2014) (emphasizing that having 
many institutions with lawmaking power enables overlapping political communities to 
work toward national integration, while preserving governing spaces for meaningful 
disagreement when consensus fractures or proves elusive). 
72. See id. at 2099-3000.
73. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 52 (2006) (stating that the access points that
were created include the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at the national level, 
as well as comparable entities at the state and local levels).  
74. GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS: TRANSFORMING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND
SOCIETY 25 (Jonathan P. Doh & Hildy Teegan eds., 2003). 
75. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 49.
76. GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS, supra note 74, at 25.
77. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 53.
78. Id.
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NGOs to form political parties and win seats in the national 
legislature than do two-party systems, which exist in the USA 
and the UK.79 
Institutional variation between the United States and 
Europe stem from social, political, economic, historical, and 
geographic experiences.80 EU NGOs’ influence on food law was 
successful; however, NGOs’ in the United States failed to 
influence food law. Due to the varying institutional structures, 
public universities and private colleges, rather than NGOs, 
should play a role in shaping food law and corporate 
responsibility in the United States. 
III. The United States Should Allow Public
Universities and Private Colleges to Shape Food 
Law and Corporate Responsibility
The United States’ institutional structure is too different 
from Europe’s; NGOs cannot successfully shape food law and 
corporate responsibility. However, some type of institution or 
organization must serve as the counterweight to capitalism and 
globalization in the United States. Without that counterweight, 
the food industry will lobby the governmental systems, 
producing monetary or other private benefits for industry, or 
influencing government legislation in ways that undercut any 
attempts to serve the broader public interests.81 In addition, 
79. PETERSON, supra note 50, at 11 (stating that the multiparty political system
contributes to higher level of environmental consciousness among European voters than the 
average US voters). 
80. See generally, NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
supra note 70. 
81. Craig Holmana &William Luneburgb, Lobbying and Tansparency: A
Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Reform, 1 INTEREST GROUPS & ADVOCACY, 75, 78 
(2012). The food industry lobbying for its own interests, and influencing consumers, is best 
demonstrated through the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA). 
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA), Pub. L. No. 103-417, 
108 Stat. 4325, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 
(2000)). DSHEA worked to prevent the federal government’s interference with the 
supplement industry in four ways. See generally Melissa Card & John Abela, Self-
Prescribing a Legal Overdose or Duped into Deficiency? – Should Dietary Supplements 
Regulations Be Changed to Avoid Health Adversities? IFIS: FOOD AND HEALTH 
INFORMATION, (forthcoming fall 2017). The first means was the expansion of the 
definition of a dietary supplement. Prior to DSHEA, dietary supplements were defined as 
vitamins and minerals. Id. DSHEA expanded the statutory definition to include herbal, 
botanical, and diet products. Id. The second means in which DSHEA prevented federal 
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NGOs create and institutionalize new norms in society 
promoting what they perceive to be more ethical and socially 
responsible business practices.82 The issue becomes which 
institution should serve as a counterweight to capitalism and 
globalization, and promote ethical and socially responsible 
business practices in food law? This section concludes that, in 
the United States, public universities and private colleges should 
shape food law and corporate responsibilities, rather than NGOs. 
This section argues that institutional structures in the United 
States include public universities and private colleges, therefore, 
public universities and private colleges should have a seat at the 
table when it comes to policy-making. Additionally, this section 
emphasizes that public universities and private colleges are the 
best places for collaboration amongst diverse perspectives to 
create solutions addressing industry needs, while also 
counteracting capitalism and globalization. 
In part, NGOs are ineffective at influencing United States’ 
law and corporate responsibility because there are too many 
access points, and NGOs have no formal standing in the public 
policy process.83 However, universities and colleges have a 
direct access point to influence food law and corporate 
responsibility. University and college members comprise the 
Advisory Committees of the FDA.84 The Advisory Committees 
provide advice to the FDA Commissioner on specific complex 
intervention was that manufactures did not need to prove that their product was safe prior 
to manufacturing them. Id. The third means in which DSHEA prevented federal 
intervention was that DSHEA grandfathered in the safety of supplements that were 
marketed in the United States prior to October 15, 1994. Id. The last means in which 
DSHEA prevented federal intervention was that DSHEA allowed supplement 
manufacturers to label their products with statements of nutritional support. See also 
MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 
(3rd ed. 2013). 
82. See Jay Aronson, Non-governmental Organizations Lecture, CARNEGIE MELLON, 
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~iliano/courses/07F-CMU-CS502/ lectures/TGD 
07-L16-NGO.pdf (stating that the counterweight to the impersonal forces of governmental 
bureaucracy and globalization is non-governmental organizations).  
83. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 52.
84. Roster of the Science Board to the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/ 
ScienceBoardtotheFoodandDrugAdministration/ucm115370.htm (last updated June 29, 
2017).  
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scientific and technical issues that are important to the FDA.85 
The Advisory Committees’ advice influences the FDA’s 
decisions on various regulations, and provides functions that 
support the FDA’s mission of protecting and promoting public 
health.86 
In addition to having access to the FDA, universities and 
colleges are better suited to influence food law and corporate 
responsibility because universities and colleges afford 
collaboration from a diverse group of individuals who are well-
educated, and have both industry’s and consumers’ perspectives 
in mind. In fact, universities and colleges can serve the FDA 
even better than current advisory committees because 
universities and colleges can assess the science, as well as the 
economic impact, policy considerations, social injustice 
concerns, and legal issues.87 For example, genetic engineering 
would have benefitted from diverse viewpoints because GE 
foods require people to reimagine the relationship between 
science, politics, health, and society.88 Therefore, universities 
contain the various disciplines that are necessary to reach a 
conclusion regarding science, politics, and society. 
IV. Conclusion
Disputes between Europe and the United States over real 
and perceived concerns about food safety will continue due to 
different perspectives on corporate responsibility and different 
institutional processes for settling those differences. While 
NGOs are the counterweight to capitalism and globalization, the 
United States’ institutional process does not allow for NGOs to 
have an influence on food law and corporate responsibility. In 
85. Science Board to the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Science 
BoardtotheFoodandDrugAdministration/default.htm (last updated May 2017). 
Additionally, the Science Board will provide advice that supports the FDA in keeping pace 
with technical and scientific developments, and it will provide expert review of Agency 
sponsored intramural and extramural scientific research programs. Id. 
86. Committees & Meeting Materials, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. https://www.fda.
gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/default.htm (last updated May 
2017).  
87. E.g., Food Law & Policy, CENTER FOR HEALTH LAW & POLICY INNOVATION,
http://www.chlpi.org/food-law-and-policy/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
88. KELLY CLANCY, THE POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 4 (2016). 
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the United States, public universities and private colleges should 
shape food law and corporate responsibilities, rather than NGOs. 
The institutional structures in the United States include public 
universities and private colleges, therefore, public universities 
and private colleges have a seat at the table when it comes to 
policy-making. Additionally, public universities and private 
colleges are the best places for collaboration amongst diverse 
perspectives to create solutions addressing industry’s needs, 
while also acting as a counterweight to capitalism and 
globalization. 
